The amount of cooperation needed to improve the welfal"e of signatories of International Environmental Agreements (lEAs), in the presence of market imperfections, depends on the characteristics of pollution. In a dynamic model, the conventional wisdom on the effect of freeriding needs to be modified for certain types of pollution problems. For local pollution problems, a sufficient level of free-riding actually promotes signatories' welfarc. For global pollution problems, the conventional wisdom is correct insofar as free-riding makes it more difficult to form a suecessful lEA. However, for some global pollution problems, free-tiding may disappeaT. A static model may overstate or understate the difficulty of forming a successful lEA. The effect of an lEA is sensitive to differences between the duration of the lEA and agents' planning horizon. JEL Classification Numbers: F12, F42, Q28
Introduction
Most environmental problems involve stocks, such as greenhouse gasses or top-soil, which change slowly over time. The existence of these stocks means that policy changes have different effects in the short and the long run. The welfare effects of Intemational Environmental Agreements (IEAs), and therefore the incentives to join these agreements, depend on the dynamics of the environment. Most studies of lEAs use static models or complicated dynamic models that require numerical solutions. Both approaches are valuable, but neither shows clearly the links between dynamics, the characteristics of pollution, and the role of international agreements. We use a simple dynamic model to study these links.
According to conventional wisdom, the incentive to free-ride makes it difficult to form IEAs, and intemational trade makes the problem worse. These beliefs are based on the observation that pollution abatement by IEA members increases their costs in pollution-intensive industries. This increase shifts comparative advantage in these industries towards non-member countries, increasing output and pollution there. Thus. intemational trade helps non-member countries earn higher returns by free-riding on the virtuous behavior of nations that sign lEAs.
In this situation. anon-member' s free riding increases the members' cost of adhering to the lEA.
We examine the relation between the characteristics of pollution and the amount of cooperation needed to improve the welfare of lEA signatories. This model shows that the conventional wisdom on free-riding is incorrect for certain types of pollution problems. There are circumstances where actions that appear to be free-riding improve welfare of lEA signatories.
In this case, free-riding may make it easier to form an lEA. In other situations, where free-riding would harm members, non-members may have no incentive to free-ride.
The source of the dynamics in our model is that current aetions harm the environment, 2 increasing future production costs. Many current production practices degrade the resource base that is vital for future productivity. Flood irrigation, intensive chemical use and other farming techniques degrade the quality of the top-soil. Over-harvesting of forests can cause soil erosion and flooding. Industrial emissions pollute water and cause acid rain. CFC products harm the ozone layer, increasing ultra-violet radiation exposure. Burning of fossil fuels is a cause of global wanning. These production practices may lead to higher future production costs. For example, a lower quality of top-soil requires increased use of fertilizer, and global warming may impose large costs on agriculture due to changes in weather patterns.
Couno'ies have attempted to f0l111 lEAs to deal with some transnational environmental problems, e.g. for the management of fisheries, river basins, wildlife, and atmosphere (Barrett, 1991; Enders and Porges, 1992; Blackhurst and Subramanian, 1992) . In most agreements cooperation is limited in at least three ways. First, some nations that contribute to the environmental damage do not join the lEA. Second, the goals of lEAs are often quite modest, involving relatively small departures from voluntary levels. Finally, cooperation may eventually end, or the start of cooperation may be delayed. Either there is a possibility that the agreement will fall apart or be weakened, or the negotiation phase takes years, during which time countries are free to choose their own environmental policies. In either case, the duration of the agreement and the planning horizon are different.
The first assumed limitation, i.e., that only a subset of potential members joins the lEA, is an obvious reflection of historical experience. The second and third assumed limitations, i.e. that the goals are modest and that the duration of the agreement and the agents' planning horizon differ, are potentially controversial.
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In the absence of an lEA, we assume that every nation takes other nations' environmental policy as given and chooses its optimal policy. The outcome is thus a non-cooperative Nash eqnilibrium of a simultaneous move game. In describing the IEA as "modest", we mean that the agreement requires members to make small reductions in the amount of environmental damage that they cause. The equilibrium with an agreement is a perturbation of the noncooperative Nash equilibrium that occurs in the absence of an agreement. We explain why we adopt this method of analyzing IEAs in the next section.
The third assumed limitation of the IEA is that the duration of the agreement and agents' planning horizon are different. When agents have a two-period horizon, as in our model, this assumption means that either the agreement comes into effect in the first period but vanishes in the second (the lEA is temporary), or that it is in effect only in the second period (the IEA is delayed). We consider both possibilities, but focus on the former type of lEA. There are two interpretations of the temporary IEA. One interpretation is that agents think that the agreement will literally fall apart. For example, governments may be able to restrain pollution for a short time, while public attention is focused on environmental problems. Over time, however, their collective backbone and the agreement may atrophy. Another interpretation, which would require only minor changes in our analysis, is that agents expect that the requirements of the lEA will not be binding in the future, possibly because of exogenous changes in information or technology. Murdoch et al (1997) explain how the degree to whieh an IEA is binding changes over time. The second scenario, in which the agreement eomes into effect only in the second period, can be motivated if there are costs that cause a delay in sueeessful negotiations. 4 Historically, lEAs have required substantial time to negotiate.! For both types of IEAs, governments with rational expectations cOlTectly anticipate the future.
We hold the second two types of limitations fixed, and allow the number of members of the IEA to vary. Our objective is to understand how characteristics of the pollution problem detennine the fraction of countries necessary to make an agreement successful. A "successful" agreement is one which raises signatories' welfarc. We consider three characteristics of the pollntion problem. The first is the extent to which current production affects future costs via the accumulation of pollution stocks. The second is the degree of myopia among the decision makers.
Since environmental externalities are largely felt in the future, the rate of discount affects both the amount of pollution in an equilibrium without an agreement, and the welfare effects of an agreement. The third cnvironmental characteristic is the extent to which the problem is local or global.
There is a large literature on the interaction of trade and the environment and on limited cooperation in environmental agreements. (In addition to the literatnre already cited, see Dean 1992 for a survey, and Black et aI, 1993; Bohm, 1993; Cal1'aro and Siniscalo, 1993; Heal, 1994; Hoel, 1994 Hoel, , 1997 and Karp and Sacheti, 1996) . Onr paper is also related to the su'ategic U'ade literatnre (Brander and Spencer, 1985) and the application of strategic trade to an environmental setting (BatTen, 1994b; D. Ulph, 1994) . Since these papers usc static models, they cannot examine how the outcome of limited cooperation depends on the importance of the future.
! For example, one of the ostensible reasons for the US's reluctance to enter negotiations for a global agreement on forests is that these would provide an excuse for inaction during the lengthy negotiation phase. 5 In order to analyze the welfare effect of an lEA we need to ask how an agent's welfare depends on a tiva!' s action, and how non-members react to the members' reduction in emissions.
The conventional answers are that an agent is harmed by a rival's emissions, and that nonmembers increase emissions in response to the lEA. We explain why one or both of these answers may be incorrect In a static framework, free-riding under-cuts member countries' competitive position. making it more costly for a nation to join an lEA. The improvement in global environmental quality is also undet111ined when non-members increase pollution. In our dynamie model, an increase in current production increases a stock of pollution, which increases future costs. Here there are circumstances in which free-riding is not detrimental to environmental agreements. Members' lower future production costs may offset the losses they suffer in the current period due to non-members' under-cutting. The future cost advantage that members enjoy is larger. the more that non-members under-cut them in the cUlTent period. In this case, members of an lEA may benefit from the non-members' free-riding. In ofher situations, lEA members would be hal1l1ed by free-riding, but the non-members incentive to freeride vanishes. In intermediate cases, free-riding occurs and hal1l1s lEA members. In these cases, consideration of the future may make it more or less difficult to form a successful lEA. Brander and Taylor (1997) note the difference between instantaneous and long-run effects of heterogenons environmental policies. Other things equal. a laxer environmental policy gives a nation a short run competitive advantage in pollution-intensive industrics. However, increased cUlTent production in these sectors may degrade their environment and increase their future costs to such a degree that in the long run comparative advantage shifts to nations with more stringent environmental policies. This difference between the shon and long run effeet on costs is central 6 to our results. The lEA and non-members response to it changes the inteltemporal allocation of production. In this sense, the lEA is an implicit market sharing agreement, but the shares are over time, rather than geographical regions or quality characteristics.
The next Section cxplains why we u'eat the lEA as a perturbation of a noncooperative equilibrium. Section 3 describes a two-period pollution model and Section 4 studies the noncooperative equilibrium. In Section 5 we consider limited cooperation in a temporary coalition, and in Section 6 we discuss the incentives to cooperate in a delayed coalition. Section 7 concludes.
The Basic Approach to Analyzing an lEA
In the Introduction we explained that we treat an lEA as a pel1urbation of a symmetric non-cooperative equilibrium to a game with simultaneous moves. Gaudet and Salant (1991) used this approach to study cartels, and many game-theorists find it unexceptionable. Those readers can skip this Section without loss of continuity. However, some environmental economists have objected to our characterization of an lEA. on the grounds that the outcome does not represent an equilibrium to a game. We explain why we considcr this objection unimportant. However, to motivate our approach. we first discuss the two most obvious alternatives to it. We then give two reasons for adopting our approach.
First. the signatories to an lEA might become Stackelberg leaders. with non-signatories as followers. That is, creation of an lEA changes the game from one of simultaneous moves to one of sequential moves, in which the lEA chooses its policy first. Barrett (1992 Barrett ( , 1994a this assumption to study the (endogenous) number of signatories in a "stable" lEA.' He finds that the equilibrium size of the lEA is small in situations where cooperation has the potential to produce large efficiency gains. It is not clear why joining an lEA transfOlllis a "Nash competitor" into a Stackelberg leader. If this transfOllliation were ever to occur, it would be more likely in circumstances when the lEA was large, i.e., when it is reasonable for the members to expect to influence non-members' policies. Also, if signatories did become Stackelberg leaders, then in general they would benefit from forming such agreements, and we would see many (possibly small) lEAs. The assumption that signatories become StackelDerg leaders eliminates a major obstacle to the fOllllation of an lEA -the possibility that it harms members.
Since our objective is to understand impediments to the formation of IEAs, the Stackelberg assumption may be inappropriate.
The second alternative assumption is that an lEA takes as given non-members' policies and chooses its own policies optimally. The outcome is then the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium to a game with simultaneous moves. In this situation, members' welfare may be lower in an lEA because of the endogenous response of non-members, exactly as in the "disadvantageous cartel" of Salant et al (1983) .
We have two reasons for assuming the lEA is "modest", and represents only a perturbation from the original symmetric Nash equilibrium. First, in some cases this assumption appears to describe the world. because negotiators are often willing to consider small but not , Barrett's definition of stability has been widely used. but has the disadvantage that the "stable equilibrium" is suppoI1ed by certain beliefs about what would happen following a deviation from equilibrium, and those beliefs are not "rational", so the stable equilibrium is not subgame perfect. Recent alternative approaches to modeling cartel stability, which address this problem, include Chatterjee et al (1993) , Bloch and Ghosal (1994) , and Ray and Vohra (1994) . Our other reason for analyzing the modest lEA rather than the Nash equilibrium to an asymmeuic game is even more practical: we can do one but not the other. Even for an extremely simple model, eomparing welfare in two equilibria, one of which is asymmetric, requires the use of simulations.
3 Analysis of the perturbed Nash equilibrium, on the other hand, leads to analytic results. These results help our intuition about the formation of lEAs.
We have defended the "modest" assumption on the grounds of plausibility and practieality.
There remains the potential objection that our proposed outcome under the lEA does not represent the equilibrium to a game. This objection has superficial appeal. There is an unlimited -probably an uncountable -number of situations we might conceivably study. Restricting attention to equilibrium outcomes imposes discipline on economic research. Our approach appears to violate this restriction, since we analyze a perturbation of the Nash equilibrium, rather than the equilibrium to a perturbed game.
However, a little reflection shows that the distinction between the two is vacuous in many cases. Providcd that the equilibrium outcome to the game is differentiable in underlying parameters, there is a one-to-one relation between a perturbation of those parameters and a perturbation of the equilibrium. Thus, studying the welfare effects of a perturbation of the equilibrium is no less legitimate than studying the welfare effects of a change in the underlying parameters.
In order to see the relevance of this observation, consider a pollution emissions game in which agent i's "intrinsic concern" for the environment is measured by a parameter Pi' At the initial non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, Pi = 0 for all i. When country i decides to cooperate (e.g. join an IEA) its preferences do not change, but its behavior changes because it intemalizes some effects which it previously ignored. The outcome is observationally eqtiivalent to a situation where country i delegates authority over emissions to a decision-maker with a positive value of the "intrinsic concern" parameter, and that decision-maker then plays non-cooperatively.
If the values of Pi' i = 1,2... S, are chosen appropriately (and given some fairly obvious technical requirements), the Nash outcome under the delegation game where all agents play noncooperatively, and the outcome under the game in which the S countries form a coalition and play non-cooperatively vis-a-vis the other countries, are identical. The welfare of countries in the delegation game are the same as under the coalition.
Countries in an lEA may not succeed in internalizing all of the costs of their actions. We could analyze a situation with a modest amount of cooperation by considering a coalition that does not achieve full internalization, or equivalently by studying a delegation game in which the "intrinsic concern" parameters are small. There is a straightforward relation between the extent of cooperation amongst the signatories and the "intrinsic concern" parameters'" If we want to study a small amount of cooperation, we can consider a perturbation of those parameters.
However, such a detour would serve no purpose. If we want to study a small amount of cooperation, we might as well eut to the ehase and consider a pel1urbation of the original equilibrium. This perturbation is, of course, 1I0t arbitrary. If an lEA means anything at all, it must mean that signatories reduce their emissions.
A Two·Period Pollution Model
We begin by describing the dynamics of pollution in a two·peliod modeL Counu'y i's pollution stock at the beginning of period 2, before produetion in that period occurs, is
where superscript i, ( 1,..,N) denotes the country, and the subseript, {1,21 denotes the time period. Pollution stock in country i, at the beginning of period 2 (xD, is a funetion of both domestic production (q;) and total foreign production (Q';) in period 1. (Since we have a two period model, we set the initial pollution level to 0, without loss of generality.) The parameter Y measures the strength of current production in contributing to the pollution stock.
Environmental problems can be thought of as existing on a continuum, from local to global. The parameter a in equation (l) measures the level of pollution spillovers. A problem (e.g. soil erosion) is local if production within a country has no effect on the pollution stock elsewhere (a = 0). A problem (e.g. global wanning) is global if the extent of environmental damage is independent of the source (a I). In intem1ediate cases, a unit of output generated abroad contributes less to pollution in a country than does a unit of domestic production (0 < a < 1). When we speak of one problem as bei ng "more global" than another, we mean that there is more spillover in the impact of current production 011 future pollution stocks, so a is larger.
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Our f0111mlation treats pollution as a "non-rivalrous public bad" when ex = 1. If we hold each country's output constant and increase a, the amount of domestically generated pollution is unchanged, but the amount of pollution generated abroad, and thus the total amonnt of pollution, increases, An increase in ex therefore implies not only that spillovers are greater, but also that there is more pollution, (The increase in foreign damages, as a increases, resulting from fixed production, is not associated with a decrease in local damages,) An altemative model, which we do not use, would assume that each unit of output is associated with a certain amount of pollution, the distribution of which dcpends on a transportation paramcter. ThaCfotmulation means that when domcstically created pollution travels abroad, less remains at home.'
The Non-cooperative Equilibrium
Here we present the subgame-perfect symmetric Nash equilibrium in a two-period, imperfect-competition model with N firms. Each firm is located in a different country. In the next two sections we perturb this equilibrium in order to study the impact of a limited lEA on members' welfare.
We identify a nation's welfare with domestic profits. (More generally, we could include consumer wclfarc, and allow for the possibility that pollution has a direct effect on welfare.) A nation's production creates a pecuniary externality, via the market price, and possibly a nonpecuniary externality, via increased costs. The model's important features are: (i) Domestic industry profits depend on domestie and aggregate world production and pollution stocks.
(ii) The increased cost associated with environmental damage, caused by CUlTent production. is felt only 12 in the future. (iii) The pollution externality may depend on rivals' as well as own produetion.
(iv) In maximizing the stream of discounted welfare (profits), agents recognize that CUlTent production decisions affect future costs via the stock of pollution.
The world price net of constant marginal cost (in the absence of environmental damage)
is p(Q') = 1 -Q" where Q. = L, q: is aggregate production in period t. In the second period country i chooses q; to solve: 
In choosing first period production, countries take into account the impact of current production on future pollution stock and thus on future profitability. The first period maximand for eountry i is W' '" 1[; + m'!(x;, x,), where x; is given by (1) and I' is the discolInt factor. With Q'; defined as i's rivals' cumulative produetion in period 1, and using (1) and (4). i's maximization problem
(N + I?
An increase in Q':, decreascs i's first period profits, but may increase or decrease second period profits, and therefore has an ambiguous effect on i's total profits. The first order condition to 
An increase in the importance of the future decreases the incentive to produce today, so i1qtli1r < O. For a larger diseount factor, the stock of pollution has a larger (in absolute value) shadow value. Thus, a finl1 wants to decrease CUlTent production to decrease future pollution stock. We can also show that (qnu." < (qnu.,' When an increase in domestic production increases rivals' costs, countries have a strategic incentive to produce more in the first period.
We now describe the restrictions on exogenous parameters that ensure that the solution of the first order conditions gives a stable, interior Nash equilibrium. The second order condition in period 1 requires G < 0, which is equivalent to y < Y=(N+ 1)/[N -a(N-l)~rl. The "diagonal dominance condition" is sufficient for stability (Dixit, 1986) . This condition requires that G + This inequality implies, after using (6), y < y", (N+I)/[I + a(N-I)]. In summary, the feasible region for y, which satisfies the second order condition for a global maximum, the stability condition, and has positive quantities in both periods is: (i) for l' < (N+ 1)'/4, y < min {y, y, )i}, and (ii) for l' > (N+I)'/4, Y< minly', y, )i}6
Limited Cooperation in a Temporary Coalition
Here we consider the change in the welfare of lEA members, when the lEA requires a small, temporary reduction in pollution (output). In the first period, some countries join the IEA and require their firms to decrease current output, relative to the non-cooperative equilibrium. In the second period the environmental coalition falls apart or ceases to be binding and finTIs revert to a non-cooperative equilibrium. However, because of the first period lEA, firms no longer have identical stocks in the second period when ex < 1. At the beginning of the game, agents know that the lEA lasts only for one period.
Let S be the number of IEA member countries. These countries are constrained to choose q';" an amount slightly smaller than the first period symmetric Nash equilibrium quantity. The N-S non-member countries endogenously choose their first period output q7 as a best response to the members' output. (The superscript "m" denotes an lEA member, and "n" denotes a non-" We repeat some notation, in order to help the reader in keeping it straight. The second order condition implies y < y. The diagonal dominance condition implies y <)i. A positive valne of q; implies y < y'. A positive value of q; requires y < y 15 member.) In the second period all N countries simultaneously choose their output q~. Using the first order condition and evaluating the derivative at the symmetric Nash equilibrium, the change in total profits of a member, country j, is
where dWi/dQ'; is the impact on the net present value of domestic profits due to a change in total foreign production, and dQ'j1dq';' is the equilibrium change in the total foreign production due to the lEA. In the Introduction we mentioned that the welfare effect of an lEA depends on the signs of these two tetms.
Players are symmetric, so Ql = (N-S)q~' + (S-I)q'l', and
Totally differentiating a non-members' first order condition, F + Gq; + H(N-S-I)q; + HS qT =
0, implies dq," -SH
=~--;-;.,---;;----;-;--;-;
Since the denominator in equation (9) is negative', sign(dq'!/dq':') = sign(H). If H > 0, a decrease in member output leads to a decline in the non-member output, and actions are strategic complcments. If H < 0, a decrease in member output causes the non-members to expand current production, and actions are strategic substitutcs. Using the definition of H, we see that H < 0 whenever ry is sufficiently small and/or a < 1/2. When pollution is local or not very imponant for future costs, non-members react to a temporary lEA by relaxing their own environmental restrictions. The non-members take advantage of the increased opportunities for current profits. If, however, pollution is both important and global, stronger environmental policies by lEA members increase future profit opportunities for non-members by enough to cause non-members to reduce current emissions.
Whether policies are strategic substitutes or complements depends on the nature of the environmental externality, but not on the number of members in the lEA.
To help interpret these results. we decompose the non-member first order condition as 
Here, 6CD represents the change in current profits of a non-member due to a change in its cun-ent output, q'," for a given level of member output q';' and the output of other non-members.
Similarly, 6FD is the change in future profits of a non-member due to a change in its current second order condition to the non-member's these two changes in profits. If the future is not important (ry = 0), the 6FD line collapses to the hOlizonta1 axis and the optimal production level is at point B. Current production is no longer constrained by the existence of pollution and the resulting increase in future costs. When member production, q';" decreases, the graph of 6CD shifts out to the dashed line (the coefficient on q';' is oS). With a lower member production, marginal profits in the current period increase for a non-membcr.
Therefore, for ry = O. the non-member increases current production to point C. Policies are strategic substitutes and we have Remark 1.1.
However, when the future is important (ry> 0) a decrease in current member production may increase or decrease non-member production. As before, a decrease in member production causes i1Cf1 to shift out. If a non-member were to consider just the change in current profits, it would expand production to point I. However, the decrease in member production has an impact on future non-member profits, depicted by the movement of i1FH The direction of the shift in this line is determined by the sign of the function 2ry'(l-2a)(N-a[N-Ij), which is positive if and only if a < ]/2.
For fairly local pollution (a < 1/2) i1Ff1 shifts in because the (absolute) shadow value of the stock falls. The intersection of the two curves then implies a larger non-member current production, such as at point D. Actions are strategic substitutes. When pollution is fairly local, a decrease in member production does not change future costs of a non-member by much.
However, the current decrease in member production makes the non-members relatively less efficient producers in the future. Thus, a non-member expands first period production.
On the other hand, for fairly global pollution (a > 1/2), the (absolute) shadow value of the stock increases with the decrease in member production, so i1Ff1 shifts out. If the intersection of the two curves is at a point such as E, actions are strategic complements. (a., yand l' are large.) When pollution is quite global and has a large effect on costs, a decrease in member production decreases future costs of a non-member. A non-member then has a larger incentive to shift production to the future. We now analyze the impact on the net present value of domestic profits due to a change in total foreign production. Using equation (5) Evaluating this expression at the symmetric Nash equilibrium and using equations (3) . (5) to simplify, we obtain
If pollution is fairly global (ex> 1/2), domestic welfare declines with an increase in total rival current output. If, on the other hand, pollution is fairly local (ex < 1/2), and in addition ry > (N+ l)/2(1·2ex), domestic welfare increases with an increase in total rival output. By direct calculation we can show that the critical value of ry, (N+ 1)/2( 1·2ex), lies in the feasible parameter spaee which we described in Section 3. In summary, equation (12) implies:
An increase in current non·member production has two effects on domestic profits. First, higher foreign production decreases price. decreasing members' current profits. The second effect, 20 on future profits, is ambiguous and depends on the type of pollution (measured by a), If the pollution problem is fairly global, an increase in rival production causes future domestic costs to rise due to higher world-wide pollution stock. Consequently, future domestic profits fall.
Thus, total domestic profits fall as well (Remark 2.1). However, when pollution is fairly local, an increase in rivals' total current output decreases the member firms' relative costs in the future and thus might increase their future profits. When current profits fall and future profits rise, the impact on total profits is ambiguous. If the future is valued sufficiently highly (1' is large) and the pollution problem is significant (y is large), lEA members' total welfare increases with nonmembers' increased CUlTent output.
Using the information on strategic complementarity and substitutability (equations 8 and 9), and the information on the change in domestic profits due to a change in foreign production (equation I2) in equation (7) we obtain
We denote H/G as the "critical fraction" of lEA membership. The welfare effect of thc lEA on members depends on the relation between (5-1 )/(N-I), the fraction of other countries that actually join (hereafter, the "actual fraction") and the critical fraction. Depending on the type of pollution problem, the actual fraction has to be either larger or smaller than the critical fraction for a 21 member country's total welfare to improve in a temporary lEA. If the actual size of the IEA is not on the "correct side" of the critical size, members of the IEA have lower welfare than in the symmetric non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, without the IEA. Table 1 summarizes the implications of equations (9), (12) and (13). The entry "any size" in the last box of the table, means that for large 0. and y, even a unilateral reduction in current output (i.e., S = I) increases welfare for the country that makes the reduction; therefore, a successful lEA can be "any size". If an increase in total rival production increases domestic profits (ClWJ/ClQ{ > 0), the actual fraction of countries in an lEA has to be smaller than the critical fraction for members' welfare to increase. If there are too many members, current expansion in output of the non-members is too small to give the members a siguificanl COSI advantage over the non-members in the future.'
(The larger is the lEA membership, the more nations there are with lower costs in the future and the fiercer is future competition.) Thus, the members are unable to recoup the loss in eutTent S As a consistency check for this result, suppose that ClWJ/ClQ,; > 0 and consider the limiting case where S = N. From equation (8) dQi/dq':' = N-1. Substituting this equation into (7) gives the welfare effect (N-I)ClWJ/ClQi > O.
profits: joining the IEA reduces their welfare. In this case, the conventional wisdom on freeriding is reversed. A "successful" lEA requires a sufficiently large number of free-riders -i.e., a small number of members. Having enough free-riders ensures that member counu'ies gain a large enough competitive advantage to enable them to recover first period lost profits.
On the other hand, if an increase in total rival production decreases domestic welfare (dWi/dQ'j < 0, which is the "usual case"), the actual fraction of countries in the lEA has to be larger than the critical fraction for member welfare to increase. lEA members want there to be few non-members who expand ClllTent production. Here, the conventional wisdom on free-riders is correct: free-riding makes it difficult to form an lEA. However, if policies are strategic complements (H > 0), free-riding does not OCCUl'. A coalition of any size is profitable because non-members also contract production along with the member(s). Therefore, a unilateral (S = 1) decrease in output is also beneficial. (Table I, When countries ignore the future, the critical lEA size is 1/2; we refer to this as the "myopic fraction". The myopic fraction does not depend on (J. because the level of pollution can affect. behavior only in the second period (Remark 3.1). However, when the future is important, the critical fraction may be larger or smaller than the myopic fraction, depending on the type of pollution problem, characterized by (J. (Remark 3.2) . For global problems such as the ozone layer depletion and global warming, consideration of the future decreases the amount of cooperation needed for a successful lEA. Here, even when the conventional wisdom on the detrimental effects of free-riding remains COlTect, consideration of the future decreases the severity of the problem. The explanation is that if a~1, nonmembers benefit from lower costs when members reduce current emissions. When non-members take the future into account, their incentive to expand current production is smaller, since expansion would decrease their future profits. When non-members have a reduced inccntive to expand CUlTent production, fewer members are required for an lEA to be successful. Also, as we noted above, if the future is sufficicntly important (t"Y large) policies are strategic complements (H > 0) and the problem of free-riding disappears. Non-members respond to the reduction in output by lEA members by decreasing their own output. In this case, an lEA of any size (including one consisting of a single member who unilaterally reduces output) is beneficial to the member(s).
For intermediate pollution problems [1/2 < a. < (N+2)/(N+3)], successful lEAs require 24 more cooperation in a dynamic, relative to myopic, setting, For problems that are not completely global, the members have a cost advantage over the non-members in the future. Realizing their future cost disadvantage, the non-members have an added incentive to expand CU11'ent production (relative to the myopic scenario). In this case, to compensate for more severe under-cutting by non-members, a successful lEA requires more members in a dynamic than in a myopic setting.
For fairly local pollution problems (ex < 1/2), there are two possibilities. When free-liding is "bad" (dWi/dQ': < 0), consideration of the future makes the critical fraction larger than the -myopic fraction. The explanation is as above: since the under-cutting by non-members is more severe, a successful lEA requires more members. However, when free-riding is "good" (dWi/dQ'j > 0), consideration of the future decreascs the critical size of the lEA. Here, having too many, as opposed to too few members is a problem. The myopic fraction is not "too large", so an lEA of that size is successful even when the future is very important. However, lEAs smaller than the myopic fraction, which would not have been successful in the static framework, are now beneficial to the members.
Limited Cooperation in a Delayed lEA
We briefly consider the effect of limited cooperation in the future. In the first period each country chooses its output non-cooperatively, and in the second period a subset of countries join an lEA that requires their firms to decrease output slightly. In period 1 all agents know which countries will join the lEA.
An appendix, available on request, gives the expression for dWJ/dq'~, the equilibrium welfare effect for a member due to an anticipated change in its output in the next period (i.e, as a result ofjoining the delayed lEA). This expression is analogous to equation (13), which gives 25 the welfare effect in a temporary lEA. Unfortunately we arc not able to compare analytically the two equations, so we are unable to detennine whether a delayed IEA requires more cooperation than a temporary one. With a delayed lEA, the welfare effect for members depends on the equilibrium ratio of output in the first and second period, and is very complicated.
Despite the lack of analytic results for this case, we can make some comparisons between the two types of lEAs. A temporary lEA tends to shift members' competitive advantage (in the production of the environmentally damaging good) toward the future. This shift encourages nonmembers to increase their CUtTent output. The change in competitive advantage over time is strong when the environmental damage is local, but vanishes in the limiting case where the environmental damage is completely global (ex =1). The stability condition insures that if nonmembers do increase their first-period output, the aggregate increase is smaller than the decrease by members. Thus, the temporary lEA at least improves short run environmental conditions. A delayed lEA, on the other hand, decreases members' shadow value of the environmental stock, since their future production is restricted. The shadow value of the environmental stock to non-members increases, because their future competition is restricted. Therefore, the delayed lEA tends to incrcase members' output and market share in the present, and increase nonmembers output and market share in the future. If many countries anticipate joining the delayed lEA, it is likely that current output, and thus environmental damage, increases.
lO
The effect of the delayed lEA depends on the type of environmental damage. When the environmental damage is quite local, the first-period increased production by (future) members and decreased production by non-mcmbcrs, causes a substantial change in relative costs in the 10 However, when S = N we can show that welfare increases. 26 second period. This change reinforces the direct effects of the requirement that members reduce production in the second period. Consequently, for local environmental problems, we expect the delayed lEA to have a large effect on market shares and inter-temporal reallocation of production.
When the environmental damage is quite global, on the other hand, members and nonmembers havc approximately (or exactly, in thc limiting case) the same future costs. Since the future restrictions tend to increase members' first-period production, the restrictions also increase non-members' costs in the second period (for ex large). In deciding whether to increase or decrease Erst-period production, non-members have to balance two considerations: The desire to take advantage of reduced future competition makes the non-members want to reduce current production in order to keep their future costs low. However, members' actions increase nonmembers' future costs, making future production less attractive to them. The second effect is larger the more global are environmental damages.
Consequently, when ex is large, first-period actions can be strategic complements. We established that these actions are strategic complements in a temporary lEA when ex and yare sufficiently large (Remark 1.2b). Strategic complementarity benefits the environment in a temporary lEA, which reduces members' current output. However, strategic complementarity harms the environment in a delayed lEA, which tends to increase members' current output.
Conclusion
Most environmental problems involve environmental stocks, caUS1l1g the cffects of international policy coordination to differ in the short and long run. Most previous studies of lEAs have used static models or havc studied quite complicated dynamic models using simulation. Although both of these approaches can provide useful insights, neither is very helpful 27 in understanding the basic relations which link together dynamics, the characteristics of pollution, and limited international coordination of policies. We have attempted to take a step toward understanding some of these issues.
We developed a two-period trade model where current production affects future costs via the pollution stock. The domestic pollution stock depends on rivals' as well as own-production, except when pollution is purely local. The conventional wisdom is that free-riding makes it more difficult to form environmental agreements, and that international trade contributes to this problem. This conclusion, which is based on static models, needs to be modifiei:l for certain types of pollution problems. In a one-period model, non-members' opportunistic behavior necessarily ham1s members. Free-riding makes members' current cost disadvantage, caused by adherence to the lEA, more painful to them. The conventional view concenu'ates on this effect, and therefore concludes that free-riding makes it more difficult to form lEAs.
However, free-riding also contributes to members' future cost advantage. When the future is important, free-riding may contribute to the suecess rather than the downfall of IEAs with limited membership. More stringent environmental standards in the cunent period can give mcmber nations a relative cost advantage in the future, even when it causes them a cost disadvantage in the current period. Members' future cost advantage can more than offset the temporary competitive disadvantage resulting from adherence to the IEA. This possibility arises for local pollution damages, and seems to us most relevant to the discussion of environmental reform in agricultural sectors of some developing countries. For example, coffee production is concentrated in scveral Latin American and African countries which may have some market power. Coffee production causes local environmental damage, which countries have been reluctant to control because of the perceived danger of losing market share, This reluctance has led to calls for international policy coordination, and possibly the creation of International Commodity-Related Environmental Agreements, Our model suggests that free-riding may not be a significant problem in such a circumstance, For fairly global pollution problems such as global warming, when free-riding occurs the conventional wisdom is correct. In this case, non-member CllITent production, and hcnce pollution, su'ongly affects the members' future cost. Members are then unable to gain a sufficient future cost advantage to compensate for their current loss of profits due to under-culting by nonmcmbers, However, for very important and global pollution problems, actions are sU'ategic complements, so free-riding may not occur.
Even when free-riding does occur and harms lEA members, consideration of future effects may decrease the amount of coopcration needed for a successful lEA. This possibility is more likely when the environmental problem is quite global. The explanation is simply that members' current reduction of emissions decreascs future costs for all countries, making it more attractive for them to shift production to thc future, and therefore to protect the current environmental stock.
We concentrated on the temporary lEA. However, the basic mechanism behind our results is simply that CllITent reductions in environmental damages change relative costs across time,
The reductions may also change relative costs across countries, depcnding on the characteristic of pollution, These two effects would be present in a permanent lEA, although to a different degree, Therefore, we doubt that the assumption of a temporary lEA is critical.
